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Mutual funds are becoming vehicles of securities investments most favoured by the
general public worldwide. Whereas, this trend is more pronounced in the developed
securities markets of the United States of America and Europe, mutual funds are
increasingly gaining the public attention in the developing economies as well. Pakistan
is not an exception to this global trend and even though mutual funds form a comparatively
small segment of the securities markets, they have grown phenomenally over the last
few years. In recognition of their increasing importance as an investment vehicle, and
their potential role in promoting better corporate governance, the Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has recently introduced a new framework for the
regulation of mutual funds and their related Non-banking Financial Companies (‘NBFC’).
What are the strengths and weaknesses of this regulatory framework? Which corporate
law model is most suitable to the legal and economic environment in Pakistan? How
mutual industry can play optimal role in promoting corporate governance in Pakistan?
This paper attempts to address these and related questions.
This paper advances the argument that mutual funds and related institutional players
can play a vital role in enhancing corporate governance in emerging economies.
Regulatory frameworks need to be structured in a manner that would encourage the
growth of the mutual fund industry and enable it to play a proactive role in corporate
governance. The paper reviews and evaluates the regulation of mutual funds in Pakistan
in the light of the above propositions.
Section 2 outlines various models of corporate law that may be followed by the
regulators in an emerging economy, identifying the model, which we believe is most
suitable for the particular legal, and economic environment prevailing in Pakistan.
Section 3 explores the role that institutional investors, generally, and mutual funds,
particularly, can play towards the development of appropriate framework for corporate
governance and the establishment of vibrant capital and securities markets. Section 4
reviews the present state of the mutual fund industry in Pakistan while section 5 identifies
key issues, which need to be addressed if mutual funds are to play an optimal role in
promoting corporate governance and public participation in the securities markets.
2. Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies
Developing economies like Pakistan have had a tendency to import the corporate
laws and replicate the corporate regulatory frameworks prevalent in developed economies
1
The Role of Mutual Funds and Non-Banking Financial Companies in
Corporate Governance in Pakistan*
Moeen Cheema and Sikander A. Shah
*Financial support for this study was provided by LUMS-Citigroup Corporate Governance Initiative at
Centre for Management and Economic Research, Lahore University of Management Sciences. Taimur
Adil and Nadia Sattar provided excellent research assistance on the study.in the hope of achieving similar results1 and to attract foreign capital.2 More recently,
this propensity appears to have acquired an even more distinct shape, i.e., the replication
of the corporate laws of the most successful developed economy, namely the United
States of America.3 Correspondingly, Pakistan has recently adopted a corporate regulatory
structure, which appears to mimic that of the U.S. with the establishment of the Securities
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (‘SECP’). Our present discussion is in the
context of the Code of Corporate Governance (‘CCG’) imbued with the spirit of the
Cadbury Report and which, as variously pointed out, conforms to the fundamental
precepts of corporate governance as presently practiced in the U.S.A. including for
example, the enhanced role of independent directors, committees, audits and quarterly
reporting.
In order to develop a more distinctive approach towards adopting a corporate
governance regime that works in Pakistan, it must be realized that developed economies,
like those of the United States of America or the United Kingdom, follow what has
been termed as an ‘enabling’ model of corporate law.4 In this model, the company laws
themselves play a relatively minor, background and mostly facilitative role in corporate
governance. There are very few mandatory or prohibitive rules and a majority of the
major provisions are in the form of default rules. In order to achieve a balance between
the competing needs of maintaining management control and discretion and the protection
of outside minority investors, corporate law combines with other legal, market and
cultural constraints on the actions of corporate management and the controlling
shareholders. These extraneous control mechanisms include, for example, a reasonably
efficient capital market, an active market for corporate control and incentive compensation
for management. The existence of sophisticated professional accountants and securities’
lawyers, detailed scrutiny of financial disclosure, active financial media and press,
competent judiciary, sophisticated and powerful administrative agencies such as the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and self-regulatory organizations,
such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), provide significant protection to outside public shareholders.
Corporate law, therefore, is left with the task of providing the management with
appropriate mechanisms to exercise the necessary discretion and to facilitate corporate
decision-making free from unnecessary legal and procedural constraints.
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1It has been argued that a ‘simple adoption’ of the successful corporate governance framework of other
jurisdictions may not lead to the desired results unless the adopted framework is tailored to the specific
needs and conditions of the local environment [see Pistor et al. (2003) as cited in Mumtaz (2005)].
2This is an avowed motivation for the adoption of recent corporate reforms in Pakistan [see SECP-UNDP
(2003)].
3See Cunningham (1999), Cheffins (2000), and Fanto (1998).  Such developments have partially been
motivated by the need of foreign corporations to raise funds in U.S. capital markets [see Coffee, Jr. (1999)].
For the most forceful assertion of the convergence thesis, i.e., worldwide convergence on the U.S. corporate
governance model, see Kraakman & Hansmann (2003). By contrast, however, Bebchuk & Roe (1999)
assert that corporate governance framework continues to differ around the world despite globalisation and
pressure for convergence, and predict that this will continue to be the case. Also see Branson (2001), Licht,
Goldschmidt & Schwartz (2004), Roe (2002, 2003), and Palepu, Khanna & Kogan (2002).
4The discussion in this section concerning the ‘Enabling’ and the ‘Self-enforcing’ models of company laws
is largely based on the work of Black and Kraakman (1996) and Black, Kraakman & Hay (1996).In emerging economies like that of Pakistan, where there is a prevalence of family
or group-owned companies,5 and which generally lack the extra-legal constraints on
management and insider action mentioned above, it is inappropriate to import wholesale
enabling company laws crafted in developed economies.6  The assumptions that underlie
the enabling laws of developed economies are absent in emerging economies: there
are severe informational asymmetries, markets are relatively inefficient, contracting
costs are high, investors and other market players are less sophisticated and financial
intermediary services are either unreliable or too expensive.7 Family or group-controlled
companies, which are the classic ownership structure in Pakistan, require especially
robust minority protection rules. Otherwise, corporate scandals materialise resulting
in a decline in public confidence in securities’ markets: the markets develop notoriety
for high-risk and speculative trading. Outside investors, anticipating higher risks of
looting and abuse tend to demand higher rates of return on their investment. Consequently,
honest management is less inclined to seek public investment at such high costs and
prefer loans from banking institutions over equity infusion. Therefore, generally
speaking, the company laws of emerging economies must provide much greater and
more effective protection for outside minority investors than the enabling company
laws of developed economies.
However, even if the corporate laws depart from the ‘enabling model’ and provide
enhanced protection to outside minority shareholders, much like the ‘prohibitive’
corporate and securities laws adopted by the U.S. in the 1930’s,8 that begets a new set
of problems.9
Moeen Cheema and Sikander A. Shah / CMER Working Paper No. 06-47
3
5It has been argued that listed companies in Pakistan exhibit a significant disjuncture between ownership
and control, such that one study revealed that whereas the top 5 shareholders own on average 37% of the
outstanding shares, the controlling families held a higher percentage of the seats on the board of directors:
32.3% in textiles and 53.4% in other companies [Cheema (2003), Bari and Cheema (2003)]. This leads
to the enjoyment of private benefits for the controllers, and hence direct transfers from the outside
shareholders to them. This trend is further strengthened by the prevalence of pyramiding in Pakistan, which
is much more pervasive than in some of the leading East Asian markets, such as Indonesia, Malaysia,
Korea, Philippines and Thailand. Other consequences of disproportionate control enjoyed by family-
dominated boards include opposition to reforms that may challenge such entrenchment and limited trading
in the securities of these listed companies.
6A pathological study of privatisation in Russia highlighted the absence of a robust legal system, the
predominance of insider self-dealing, undue concentration of ownership and conglomeration as the main
reasons for the failure of corporate reforms [see Black, Kraakman & Tarassova  (2000), Fox & Heller
(2000)].
7Khwaja & Mian (2004) substantiate the prevalence of ‘pump and dump’ practices by brokers on Pakistan’s
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE).
8A prohibitive model is characterized by rules out-rightly prohibiting all kinds of corporate actions that are
susceptible to abuse, such as self-dealing transactions and cash out mergers. Such rules were widely
adopted in the United States and Britain the first part of the last Century, in similar market conditions as
currently experienced by the developing economies. For further discussion on prohibitive models, see
Black et al. (1996).
9However, Cheema (2003) argues that ownership structures characterized by disproportionate control vis
a vis ownership and family-dominated boards do create incentives for the management to maximize profits
since they are likely to receive a disproportionately large share. Therefore, he argues that if the control
of family groups is to be diluted through enhanced regulatory protections for minority shareholders,
ensuring effective monitoring by outside shareholders should offset this phenomenon.First, the enforcement of such protective rules is problematic due to weak legal
systems.10 The judiciary is generally believed to be corrupt and/or incompetent, especially
as regards complex financial arrangements, which require substantial understanding
of economic and financial concepts. Second, the judicial system suffers from inordinate
delays and in corporate transactions time literally translates into money.11 Third, if
investor-protection is made the primary focus of corporate law, managers of private
companies that may be suitable entrants into the securities markets are reluctant to
invite public investors for the fear that they may have to give up too much power and
control over to the minority investors disproportionate to the value of funds that they
bring in to the company.12 This leads to a situation where good companies avoid raising
equity funds in public securities markets leaving fewer good options for the public to
invest in.
The multi-billion dollar question that emerges is that: how can corporate laws
balance the divergent requirements of investor-protection and the managers’ need for
flexibility in decision-making such that sound private companies are encouraged to
enter into and raise funds in public securities markets and the general public is persuaded
to invest in their securities rather than in the relatively less productive sectors of the
economy, such as real estate.13 In response to this query, professors Black and Kraakmaan
have proposed the so-called ‘self-enforcing’ model of corporate law.14 This model
advocates the structuring of corporate decision-making in such a manner that large
outside shareholders may protect their interests and act as a check on the insiders’
misappropriation. This will solve collective action problems, which severely restrict
the small shareholders’ ability to protect their interests since the large minority
shareholders will be protecting all minority interests.
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10Black et al. (2000) argue that similar, insider-dominated, boards in post-privatisation Russia dealt with
the strategic choice between looting (short term gain) or maximizing long term profits based essentially
upon the likelihood, threshold and severity of legal sanctions. In simple words, the choices they faced
were to either loot and run, or indulge in self-dealing and enjoy private profits but at a level below the
threshold inviting serious legal liability. According to these scholars, Russia possessed a weak legal
infrastructure with the result that the threshold of legal sanctions was very high. This encouraged the
insiders to indulge in large scale self-dealing over an extended period without fear of negative consequences.
The overall business environment, corruption, red tape, organized crime and other macroeconomic factors
left long-term profits uncertain, thereby motivating the management to loot rather than invest for growth.
11Porta, Silanes & Shleifer (2003) relying on data collected from securities attorneys in forty-nine countries
(available at http://post.economis.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/securities_data.xals) rank these
countries’ securities laws in terms of investor protection. Pakistan’s securities laws appear to provide
significant public enforcement by the regulators (7.56 on a scale of 1-10) but limited private enforcement
(6.67 on the same scale). This difference is significant since, as the authors conclude, private enforcement
is far more important than public enforcement. Furthermore, the existence of appropriate laws is one
thing; adequate enforcement of these is an altogether different issue [Also see Licht et al. (2004)].
12For an overview of the conflicting position of the regulators, the Securities and Exchange Commission
of Pakistan (SECP), and many listed companies over the adoption of the Code of Corporate Governance,
[see Rais & Saeed (2005)].
13Williamson (1988) explored similar issues, concerning the appropriate balance between rules and discretion
in corporate governance.
14See Black et al. (1996).Now, if these larger minority shareholders are institutional investors, it is quite
likely that the management of the company will feel comfortable dealing with them
at a professional level without the fear of being squeezed out since such investors are
unlikely to be interested in taking over the management themselves. 
There are two main aspects of the self-enforcing model: (1) Structural constraints,
and (2) Simple ‘bright line rules’ coupled with pre-determined remedies. Structural
constraints, such as minimum board size, cumulative voting for directors, provision
for the appointment of independent directors, staggered board terms, supermajority
shareholder approval for suspect categories of transactions such as mergers, insider
dealings, etc., mandatory disclosure rules, mandatory seats for independent directors
on the board, independent directors’ representation on executive compensation and
audit committees are optional in an ‘enabling’ corporate law regime but should be
mandatory in the ‘self-enforcing’ corporate laws of a developing economy. The second
requirement of this model is that corporate laws should be framed in such a clear and
precise manner that, to put it bluntly, an unsophisticated lawyer, judge or regulator
may have little difficulty in understanding it and a corrupt judge, regulator or other
public official has little opportunity to depart from the intention of the statute/rule. For
example, whereas a statute in an enabling corporate law might require shareholder
approval of a sale transaction where “substantially all” assets are being disposed of, a
bright-line rule in a self-enforcing corporate law will set an objectively verifiable
threshold such as 50% of book value.15
Upon reviewing Pakistan’s corporate law, it appears that the Companies Ordinance,
1984 does depart from the enabling model to some extent and attempts to redress the
balance in favour of outside investors along the lines of the self-enforcing model. For
example, the requirement of minimum board size for public companies (7 directors)16
and mandatory cumulative voting17 is designed to ensure that outside minority shareholders
may be given the opportunity to achieve representation on the board of directors.18
Similarly, other provisions try to ensure that the creditors of a public company may
also be able to play an enhanced role in corporate governance.19 The Code of Corporate
Governance also goes some way towards implementing the structural constraints
proposed by the self-enforcing model including the provision for independent directors,
audit committees, more elaborate disclosure, etc.20 Furthermore, the broader aims of
the Code include development of the necessary corporate culture not only in the public-
listed companies that it applies to but also by strengthening the role of other market
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15It should be mentioned that the use of book value might be under-inclusive or over-inclusive of transactions,
primarily due to its limitation in measuring the importance of a transaction. See Black et al. (1996).
16§174 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, as amended by the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002.
17§178 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.
18Black et al. (1996) proposed in the context of law reform in Russia, ‘Self-Enforcing’ model, for which
some of the pillars are minimum board size, mandatory cumulative voting and the opportunity to elect
independent directors.
19For example, as per §182 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984, creditors may nominate directors by virtue
of contractual arrangements.
20See the Code of Corporate Governance, SECP No.2 (10) SE/SMD/2002, available at
http://secp.gov.pk/corporatelaws/pdf/CodeofCorporateGovernance.pdf.participants such as their creditors, outside directors, accountants, lawyers, the regulators
and the public investors [Cheema (2003)].21
Nonetheless, it must be realized that as regards the public investors, in order for
them to play a meaningful role in corporate governance a shareholder needs to hold a
substantial minority holding in a company. Small and independent shareholders cannot
exercise effective control on management; cannot elect independent directors through
cumulative voting or effectively review the financial information now disclosed on a
quarterly basis. Small shareholders have neither the resources nor the motivation to
play too meaningful a role. In such an environment, for the Companies Ordinance,
1984, and the Code of Corporate Governance to really achieve their objectives, the
market must rely on large outside shareholders, especially institutional shareholders,
to step up to the plate and take advantage of the minority protection provisions of the
Companies Ordinance and the Code. Mutual funds and related Non-Banking Financial
Companies (‘NBFCs’) that hold substantial minority positions in public-listed companies
can fill the gap and provide the necessary expertise and the scrutiny that would make
corporate governance more efficient.22 Hence, there is a need for regulation of mutual
funds and NBFCs in such a manner as to encourage and enable them to play an enhanced
role in corporate governance.23
3. The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance
In their study of the role of institutional investors in Pakistan, Shahnawaz Mahmood
and Haroon Sharif have pointed out that these investors can play a vital role in corporate
governance since they own substantial holdings, have significant incentive to ensure
that the companies invested in are managed properly, have negotiating power as well
as the expertise to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders and the company
on the whole.24
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21See Cheema (2003) and Black et al. (2000). The analysis of Russian failure leaves little room for optimism
if one is hoping that the adoption of good corporate laws will automatically generate a culture of transparency
and good corporate governance. In fact, as Cheema points out, the enforcement of minority protection
rules is likely to backfire rather than turn out to be beneficial. This paper essentially argues that the only
viable solution is to find means of creating a culture of corporate governance simultaneously and
independently of the adoption of good rules, through the strengthening of extra-legal market constraints
before legal enforcement is strengthened. This is an endorsement of the policy adopted by the SECP,
which has brought in the Code of Corporate Governance as part of the listing requirements without the
attachment of serious legal sanctions for failure to comply with the Code. The legal sanctions are likely
to follow at a later stage when the SECP reaches a determination that compliance with the Code has
become the norm.
22For a review of the primary arguments and academic literature supporting the assertion that institutional
investors have a very important role in promoting corporate governance, see Gillan & Starks (2003),
Bhattacharyya & Rao (2005).
23Compare with the corporate law reform implemented in Italy in 1998, the purpose of which was to spur
institutional investors, especially mutual funds, to play a more active role in monitoring of listed companies.
The new rules have dramatically improved disclosure, including quarterly reporting and minority protection
rules along the lines of the Code of Corporate Governance adopted in Pakistan [see Bianchi & Enriques
(2001)].
24See Mahmood & Sharif (2003).Most importantly, such investors have the ability to appoint truly independent
directors to the board. However, they also noted that it is not possible to verify the
extent to which institutional shareholders and their nominee directors do in fact participate
in the Annual General Meetings and the board of directors’ meetings since sufficient
data is not available. Furthermore, as depicted in Table 1, below, the authors have
argued that there is evidence that the performance of a company, in terms of return on
equity (‘ROE’) and return on asset (‘ROA’) ratios, is directly proportional to the size
of the institutions investors’ shareholding in it:
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These findings may not be entirely reliable since the causal connection between the
performance and institutional shareholding has not been credibly established. Is it that
these companies perform well because of the role that institutional investors play in
corporate governance, or is it that institutional investors tend to invest so heavily only
in those companies, which are already established, and performing well? Given the
small number of actively traded ‘blue chip’ companies on Pakistan’s stock exchanges,
it is more likely that the latter of the answers suggested above is more plausible.
Since mutual fund investors tend to own relatively smaller blocks as compared to other
institutional investors, especially as compared to the equity holdings of banks, it may
be argued that their direct role in corporate governance is diminished. It is indeed
pertinent that individual mutual fund may not be able to appoint independent directors
given limitations on their share ownership in individual companies in Pakistan, but this
problem can be by-passed with two or more mutual funds acting in concert, especially
when the same Asset Management Company or Investment Advisory group manages
these funds. Furthermore, it is even questionable whether mutual funds should appoint
directors to the board since that would tie a fund to a particular company in an undesirable
fashion and may impact the fund’s ability or desire to withdraw its investment if the
company is not performing at par. Arguably, the Mutual Funds Association of Pakistan
(‘MUFAP’) should perhaps look into devising mechanisms for recommending and
appointing independent directors on behalf of all mutual funds.
In any case, mutual funds can play a more important role in the endorsement of
adequate corporate governance mechanisms and the growth of the securities markets
by enabling the development of those very extra-legal market mechanisms the absence
of which has constrained corporate activity in Pakistan. Firstly, mutual fund managers
Table 1: Performance Indicators
ROE (%) ROA (%)
Less than 1% 13.17 1.62
Less than 10% 19.28 8.05
Less than 20% 45.39 4.05
Less than 30% 45.43 4.27
Less than 50% 68.54 3.7
More than 50% 98.93 9.54have the expertise to review and evaluate financial reports (like other institutional
shareholders); more importantly (and unlike other institutional investors) mutual funds
can pass on the pertinent information to individual investors in a comprehensible form,
thus achieving a more effective dissemination of financial information than the mere
formality of periodic reporting.25 Secondly, mutual funds act directly on behalf of the
minority shareholders and are more important than banks and other creditors since
these institutions only incidentally benefit outside small shareholders while safeguarding
their own interests qua creditors. In fact, banks and other lenders who also own shares
may suffer from serious conflicts of interest and may tend to prefer their interests as
lenders on top of their interests qua shareholders. Third, by indulging in active trading
in substantial blocks of securities, mutual funds can establish significant pressures on
corporate managers to act on behalf of all the shareholders and also help create a culture
of securities trading related to long-term performance of companies.26
Mutual funds may be regarded as one of the best avenues for investment available
to small retail investors on account of the lower transaction costs, diversification,
liquidity, especially in the case of open-end funds,27 According to the Mutual Fund
Association of Pakistan (MUFAP), both open-end and closed-end funds are incorporated
in the definition of mutual funds. For further discussion, see MUFAP (2005), available
at . and most significantly, the benefit of the expertise of the fund manager.28 Whereas
mutual funds may not shield investors from the risks associated with overall market
failure, the ability to diversify that they provide may reassure public investors as regards
the failure of individual companies and hence make them less wary of insider opportunism
in any given corporation. In Pakistan’s relatively small securities markets, lack of
liquidity may be a major concern since there are only a few listed companies whose
shares are actively traded. With the recent rise to prominence of open-end funds in the
mutual fund industry, liquidity ceases to be a concern since the units may be redeemed
at any time. Closed-end funds may not provide this satisfaction since their shares have
to be disposed of in secondary trading in the market and that too usually at a discount
on the net asset value (NAV). Hence, mutual funds alleviate some of the biggest
concerns that the public may have regarding investment in the securities markets.
Mutual funds can thus play a vital role in attracting the general public to the securities
markets and engendering public confidence in them.
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25See Dong (2003).
26The expansion of the capital markets has created an environment favourable for the growth of investment
funds in China. In return, the funds industry is playing a significant role in creating a ‘stable and mature’
capital market [see Tao (1999)].
27According to the Mutual Fund Association of Pakistan (MUFAP), both open-end and closed-end funds
are incorporated in the definition of mutual funds. For further discussion, see MUFAP (2005), available
at http://mufap.com/mufap/informations.htm.
28For benefits of investment through mutual funds, see Wang (1994).4. The State of the Mutual Funds Industry in Pakistan
The mutual fund industry in Pakistan has experienced significant growth in recent
years: the combined net asset value of all funds has increased from approximately Rs.
21 billion on June 30, 2001 to approximately Rs. 129 billion as of March 31, 2005
[Beg (2004)]. Viewed historically, as shown in Figure 1, mutual funds had earlier
flourished during the stock market boom of 1994-96 after which the industry withered
during the prolonged recession of the late 90’s. The stock market and the mutual funds
industry have resurged in recent years, especially during the period of 2002-05.29
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However, as depicted in Figure II, if viewed in terms of the ratio of NAV of funds to
the GDP, mutual funds have still not reached the same levels as they had in 1994.
Furthermore, when compared to the mutual fund industry worldwide, the mutual
fund industry in Pakistan is miniscule in size. According to Khorana, Servaes and
29See the MUFAP Country Report, 2004.This indicates that the Mutual Fund industry has significant room to grow in Pakistan
vis a vis other financial institutions. Furthermore, the mutual fund industry has generally
failed to attract individual retail investors to the securities markets.32 According to the
Mutual Funds Association of Pakistan (‘MUFAP’) Country Report, 2004, there were
only 138,643 individual investors of mutual funds as of December 31, 2003 and 155,
192 as of December 31, 2004.33  This data does not indicate whether any investors who
have bought into more than one mutual fund are included only once. Secondly, the
unit/share ownership of institutional investors vis a vis individual investors is also not
indicated.
5. The Regulation of Mutual Funds and Related Non-Banking Finance Companies
in Pakistan
In Pakistan, there are two types of mutual funds: open-end and closed-end.34  Closed-
end funds include either an investment company or a closed-end scheme.
Tufano, as of end 2001 approximately 55,000 mutual funds around the world held
assets worth $11.7 trillion representing 13.8% of ‘primary securities’ including ‘sovereign
debt, corporate equity, private sector bond/notes, or commercial loans.’30 A survey of
the mutual fund industry of fifty six (56) countries carried out by the authors revealed
that Pakistan was amongst those countries which have the lowest mutual fund assets
to primary securities ratio: i.e. mutual fund assets represented only 1.33% of the total
primary securities. This may be contrasted with the U.S. (19.3%), Hong Kong (20.3%),
South Korea (16.5%), U.K. (6.1%), Malaysia (4.0%) or even India (3.7%). These
findings are very similar to those of the SECP Working Paper where it was indicated
that out of the 24% total shares of manufacturing sector held by institutional investors
in Pakistan, only 1.16% were held by mutual funds:31
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30See Khorana, Servaes and Tufano (2004).
31See Mahmood et al. (2003).
32This is in contrast to the popularity of mutual funds amongst individual retail investors in the U.S.A for
example Hunt, Jr. (1997) notes that: ‘Americans today have more wealth invested in funds than in real
estate. A few years ago this would have been unthinkable. Millions of fund investors across the country
read magazines and watch television programs that are devoted to personal finance topics such as mutual
funds. And, billions of dollars in retirement savings are invested in mutual funds.’
33See MUFAP Country Report, 2004.
34For a brief explanation of the difference between the two types of funds in the U.S., see Symposium
(2001b).
Table 2: Pattern of ownership in Pakistan
Bank Insurance Leasing Mutual
Fund Modaraba DFI Total
Domestic 7.64 2.26 0.02 0.75 0.02 8.33 19.22
Foreign 3.87 0.37 0.23 0.41 0.00 0.24 4.91
Total 11.51 2.63 0.25 1.16 0.02 8.56 24.13An investment company is one that is registered with the SECP for the purposes
of trading in the securities of other companies; its shares are listed on the securities
markets and are traded just like that of any other company. A closed-end scheme is
one where the investors do not have the option to withdraw their investment at any
given time and may only trade in their units/shares in public securities markets. An
Investment Advisor licensed under the Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment
and Regulation) Rules, 2003 (NBFC Rules) notified on April 1, 2003 by the Securities
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), assists the fund manager in management
of a closed-end fund. A trustee is also appointed to supervise the management of the
company.35
An open-end fund is one, which gives the participants the opportunity to withdraw
their investment from the fund at any given time (redemption).36  An open-end fund
is created as a trust under the Trusts Act, 1882.37 The Trust Deed is registered with the
SECP under the NBFC Rules, 2003. An Asset Management Company approved by the
SECP is appointed as the manager of the fund. Historically, the mutual fund industry
in Pakistan has been dominated by closed-end funds. During the latest boom in the
mutual funds industry open-end funds have proliferated and are increasingly rising to
prominence in the industry. This trend reflects the evolution of mutual funds in other
emerging economies, including China [Dong (2003)].
The State Bank of Pakistan regulated the non-banking financial institutions (‘NBFIs’)
prior to the NBFC rules mentioned above. In December 2002 the responsibilities for
the regulation of NBFIs was transferred from the State Bank to the SECP as per the
recommendations of the joint committee for reconstruction of NBFIs. The Banking
Companies Ordinance, 1962 and the Companies Ordinance 1984 were amended in
order to achieve this reconstruction. The SECP, in promulgating the NBFC Rules, gave
life to the concept of the non-banking finance companies, which brought together and
under one regulatory framework all non-banking services including investment banking,
venture capital, asset management, investment and advisory services. The NBFC Rules
consolidated and substituted the Investment Companies and Investment Advisors Rules,
1971; Asset Management Companies Rules, 1995; Venture Capital Companies and
Venture Capital Rules, 2001; and Investment Finance Companies SRO 585(I)/87,
amongst others.
The difficult questions that arise relate to the manner of regulation that needs to be
devised in order to promote the mutual fund industry [Wang (1994)]. A number of
factors need to be looked at, which are discussed in detail below.
A. Barriers to Entry: Regulatory Approval
What are the requirements for and how long does it take to obtain approval for
starting a new fund? If the time and groundwork necessary for obtaining regulatory
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35In a comparative study of the American and European mutual funds Wang (1994) has outlined the
differences between the ‘corporate’ and ‘contractual’ models of fund governance.
36In the U.S. the term mutual fund is largely reserved for open-end funds. See, for example, Wang (1994).
37Also, see Wang (1994) for a description of open-end funds in U.K.approval are high it is logical to expect that mutual fund sponsors will be deterred from
introducing a diversification of funds; large consolidated funds will dominate the
market. Such funds tend to be conservative in their investment approach and avoid
‘high risk high return’ investments. This will result in a number of funds very similar
in their portfolios and returns and providing fewer genuine options for the public to
invest in. As a result, the competition between mutual funds will be reduced offering
fewer incentives for the funds to invest in research in order to out-perform each other.
Under Rule 5(1) of the NBFC Rules, separate applications have to be filed for
licences to conduct any of the specified NBFC businesses. However, the SECP may
issue a single licence for both investment advisory (for closed-end funds) and asset
management services (for open-end funds). This enables a group to launch both open-
end and closed-end type funds and reduces the time and efforts for obtaining the
necessary licences. Both closed-end and open-end funds must be authorized by the
SECP.38 Further, a closed-end fund in the form of an investment company must register
with the SECP prior to commencing business.39 If the SECP is satisfied that the company
is eligible and ‘it would be in the interest of the capital market’ it will register the
closed-end company.40
It has been reported by some sponsors of existing funds that the SECP takes
considerable time in approving the establishment of new funds. However, according
to SECP officials, any delay that exists may be attributed not only to weighty paperwork
and approval requirements, but also to the inexperience of the sponsors of funds who
fail to submit the necessary paperwork at the first instance. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to conduct a detailed study of the average timeline taken to obtain approval
for establishing funds and the specific reasons for delays, if any. As indicated already,
the longer it takes to obtain approval the lesser the number of diverse funds in the
market and the SECP should look into various possible methods of removing bureaucratic
hurdles and granting timely approval to new funds. One proposal is to fix deadlines
for the various stages in the approval process thereby requiring the regulators as well
as the sponsor NBFCs to speed up their part of the work. Furthermore, an advisory
body consisting of SECP officials and industry experts may be set up to review the
applications and advise the SECP whether or not to approve a new fund.
B. Barriers to Entry: Capitalization Requirements
Open-end funds have significant liquidity requirements since a number of investors
may chose to redeem their units on any give day. Hence, in order to ensure that such
funds may not fail, the regulators may require significant capitalization requirements;
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38See R. 41 and R. 67 respectively of the Non-Banking Financial Companies (Establishment and Regulations)
Rules, 2003, hereinafter referred to as the NBFC Rules.
39R. 36 of NBFC Rules.
40 See R. 38 of NBFC Rules.41R. 33(a) and (b) of the NBFC Rules.
42R. 67(2)(f) of the NBFC Rules.
43It is necessary to put in place a system for monitoring the behaviour of the fund manager (the investment
advisor or the asset management company). The difficulty for the investors is essentially that, given the
large number and relatively small state of individual investors, they face a collective action problem. See
Wang (1994).
however, the greater the capitalization requirements the higher the barrier to entry and
greater the dead weight that a fund has to carry. On the other hand, closed-end companies
do not have to deal with similar liquidity issues since their shares are traded in the
secondary securities’ markets. In addition, it is necessary to require the sponsors of
funds, both open-end and closed-end, to maintain ownership interest in the funds in
order to ensure responsible decision-making.
R. 5(2) (b) specifies Rs. 30 million as the minimum capital required to initiate
investment advisory services. The NBFC rules have substantially increased the
capitalization requirements for setting up an investment advisory business. As per R.
33(a), an Investment Advisor of a closed-end investment company must retain liquid
capital equal to 1 • % of the paid up capital of the fund. Furthermore, the Investment
Advisor must maintain beneficial ownership of 10-20% of the equity securities of a
closed-end fund.41 The closed-end fund must have a minimum equity of Rs. 100 million.
The capitalization requirements for initiating and operating a closed-end fund are thus
minimal. However, by insisting on the Investment Advisor maintaining a substantial
ownership interest (10-20%), the rules seek to ensure that the management of the
company’s investments is conducted in responsible and efficient manner.
The Asset Management Company of an open-end fund must give an undertaking that
it will invest or arrange the investment of Rs. 250 million for a minimum period of two
(2) years.42 The capitalization requirements for initiating and operating an open-end
fund must, of necessity, be higher than those of a closed-end fund. These requirements
do not appear to cater for funds of different sizes. Furthermore, the Asset Management
Company is required to maintain its contribution in the fund for a limited period only.
Arguably, asset management companies ought to be required to maintain a 10-20%
ownership of open-end funds as well, in order to ensure responsible decision-making.
C. Internal Corporate Governance of Mutual Funds: Avoiding Conflicts of Interest
Mutual funds are sponsored and managed by entities and individuals that are
invariably related to other market participants, including banks, brokers, etc. Furthermore,
the industry is dominated by a handful of sponsors that manage not just individual
funds but fund complexes [see Bogle (2004)]. It is, therefore, necessary to ensure that
any conflicts of interest are minimized. Otherwise, the risks of mismanagement, insider-
dealing and looting are likely to be high. If mutual funds are to play an important role
in corporate governance, it is imperative to ensure that there are no scandals regarding
mismanagement of assets by the funds themselves. In this regard, it is necessary to
structure funds in such a manner that there are inbuilt checks and balances so that the
possibilities of self-dealing and/or mismanagement are curtailed.43
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Fund Model’ followed in Pakistan, every fund is required to have a trustee with the
SECP’s approval,44 who ensures that the fund manager complies with the requirements
of the rules and the constitutive documents.45 An Investment Advisor or an Asset
Management Company must report and account to the trustee for any loss caused by
its negligence.46 The trustee must be independent of the Investment Advisor or the
Asset Management Company.47 Ensuring the genuine independence of the trustee is
vital to the internal corporate governance of mutual funds.
A closed-end fund must appoint an Investment Advisor pursuant to a contract of
a maximum duration of ten years, which sets out the duties and rights of the parties.48
R. 39 of the NBFC Rules. The contract must provide that the Investment Advisor shall
bear all management and secretarial expenses. A copy of the contract must be submitted
to the SECP for approval.49  No more than fifty percent (50%) of the directors of a
closed-end company may be affiliated with an Investment Advisor. A closed-end fund
shall not enter into any transaction with an insider or an affiliate of itself, its Investment
Advisor or any person who owns more than 10% of the closed-end fund.50
An Investment Advisor or an Asset Management Company must act in “good faith
and to the best of its ability and without gaining any undue advantage for itself or for
any of its related party.”51 The Asset Management Company of an open-end fund cannot
employ an insider as a broker, or enter into transactions with any connected broker,
which shall equal or exceed ten percent (10%) of the total transactions in any one
accounting year without the SECP’s approval.52 A mutual fund shall not invest in any
company if any insider owns more than five percent (5%), or collectively the directors
own more than ten percent (10%), of that company.53
It is also pertinent to ensure that the managers of funds possess the necessary skills
and competence. Thus, an Investment Advisor or an Asset Management Company to
furnish an undertaking to the SECP that the executive officers, researchers, and other
key personnel have the requisite qualifications and professional experience.54 These
include, inter alia:
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44R. 43 and R. 74 of the NBFC Rules.
45R. 45 and R. 76 of the NBFC Rules.
46R. 34(b) and R. 65(b) respectively, of the NBFC Rules.
47 R. 47 and R. 78 of the NBFC Rules.
48R. 39 of the NBFC Rules.
49 R. 39 (1) of the NBFC Rules. Compare with the situation in the U.S. where it is amongst the "special
responsibilities" of the independent directors of the corporate funds, also referred to as trustees, to review
and approve the investment advisory agreement [see Fernandez (1997)].
50 R. 52(1) of the NBFC Rules.
51 R. 34(a) and R. 65(a) of the NBFC Rules, respectively.
52 R. 64(1)(h) of the NBFC Rules.
53 See R. 51(n) and R. 73(3) of the NBFC Rules.
54 Rule 5(2)(h) of the NBFC Rules.• At least one Director having senior management level experience of five years;55
and
• CFO to be a chartered or cost and management accountant having senior
management level experience of five years.56
An Investment Advisor or an Asset Management Company shall not elect more
than twenty-five (25%) of its directors from the same family without the prior approval
of the SECP.57 For a critique of independent director requirements, see footnote 61. An
Investment Advisor or an Asset Management Company may not remove the CEO or
any director, other than nominee directors of creditors or of a sponsoring financial
institution, without SECP approval. Mergers, takeovers and other such transactions
also require SECP approval.58
The above rules are designed to ensure that the risks of self-dealing transactions at
the expense of public interest are minimized. This is done first through defining bright
line rules for the interaction of various parties involved with the management of the
funds so that certain structural checks and balances are created without inhibiting the
discretion available to the investment advisors or asset managers of the funds. Second,
the impartiality of the decision-makers is being sought through prohibiting the domination
of the boards of various parties by the same people. Third, the supervisory role of the
SECP has been strengthened compared to that of regulators in developed economies.
However, the role of the independent trustee needs to be further strengthened and the
SECP should look into imposing serious obligations for breach of fiduciary duties on
the trustees and the fund managers.
D. Primary and Secondary Disclosure
It is imperative that mutual fund managers make ‘primary disclosure’ regarding
their own operations to reassure the public that they are being properly managed. This
goes hand in hand with the internal corporate governance requirements discussed above.
A review of the new disclosure rules applicable to mutual funds in Pakistan indicates
that Investment Advisors and Asset Management Companies are required to make
quarterly disclosure to the SECP, to the certificate holders and the stock exchanges of
un-audited balance sheet and changes in equity,59 as well as audited annual reports.60
Close-end companies have to follow similar reporting requirements under the Code of
Corporate Governance. Generally, as a condition for granting authorization to an open
-end fund, the SECP requires regular reporting from them as well.61
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55 R. 7(1)(f) of the NBFC Rules.
56 R. 7 (1)(c) of the NBFC Rules.
57 R. 7(2)(a) of the NBFC Rules. For a critique of independent director requirements, see footnote 61.
58 R. 7(2)(c) of the NBFC Rules.
59 R. 34(b)(f) and R. 65(f), respectively of the NBFC Rules.
60 R. 34(e) and R. 65(e), respectively of the NBFC Rules.
61 Mutual fund shares are subject to disclosure requirements under the Securities Act of 1933.With regard to fund disclosures, the important issue is whether they disclose
information that an average public investor may use or do they provide information
that shields them from potential liability.62 In the U.S., for example, disclosure has
historically been targeted at the shareholders’ lawyers. However, in 1990’s the S.E.C.
initiated the ‘plain English’ movement in an attempt to make the disclosure understandable
by the average investor.63 Investors in mutual funds need more information than the
names of the officers and directors of the fund managers, or the bare financial
information;64 they need to know the investment policy, what investment decisions are
being made, what securities are being bought and sold, and how this fund differs from
the others in the market. Furthermore, if mutual funds are to play a key role in corporate
governance, it is imperative that they digest information regarding the companies they
invest or disinvest in, and pass this on to their unit-holders/shareholders65 in a
comprehensible form.66 This will help educate the investors regarding the securities
markets, lower psychological barriers to investing in corporate securities and reassure
investors that the mutual fund managers are doing their job. On the flip side, if mutual
funds are required to disclose too much of their confidential information that they may
have obtained after incurring costs on research, this will result in free-rider problems
and de-motivate funds from conducting such research.
Details regarding disclosure of information to shareholders by a close-end company
have been laid down in R. 58: the companies are required to disclose their annual
audited reports, quarterly reports, statement of securities owned at the beginning and
end of each reporting period, statement of transactions in securities during each reporting
period including the sale and/or purchase prices, details of directors’ and officers’
security holdings, amongst other things.67 There are no similar requirements for open-
end funds, although most as a matter of prudent business practice make similar disclosure.
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62 In China, there are serious civil and criminal liabilities for the use of false information to induce securities
transactions: imprisonment for up to five years and fines ranging from 10,000 to 100,000 Yuan [Dong
(2003)]. In Pakistan, the new legal regime applicable to listed securities, the Code of Corporate Governance,
does not provide for legal liabilities for failure to disclose vital information: the Code merely adds to the
listing requirements of stock exchanges and the most serious penalty for failure to provide adequate
disclosure is the threat of de-listing.
63 See Symposium (2001a).
64 After U.S. investors who had invested in offshore securities in Asia suffered huge losses in the Asian
crisis, attention was directed to the disclosure provided by the funds in Asian countries. Analysis revealed
that these funds made minimal disclosure concerning the companies they were invested in using boilerplate
language. Compared to mutual funds in the U.S., that disclose enough information to the shareholders
about their portfolio companies so that the shareholders may be able to make an independent assessment
of the fund’s investment decisions, mutual funds in Asia generally require the investor to put blind faith
in them [Krider (1998)].
65 Different jurisdictions use different terms to denote investors of mutual funds. They include, for example,
shareholders (in the U.S.), unit holders (in the United Kingdom) and beneficiaries (in Japan).
66 It has been argued that the disclosure obligations of mutual funds should be further enhanced. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which imposed new regulatory responsibilities on public companies, has
been criticized for failing to enhance the responsibility of institutional investors to their shareholders
[Karmel (2005)].
67 See R. 58(1), (2), and (4) of the NBFC Rules.It is recommended that open-end funds should be required to make disclosure to
shareholders similar to that required of close-end companies by R. 58. Furthermore,
all mutual funds should be required to submit directors’ reports along with the periodic
reports which should state briefly the funds’ investment policy and rationales for the
sale and purchase decisions undertaken during the reporting period.68
E. Risk Management
If some mutual funds are to differentiate themselves from others,69 and invest in
high growth and high risk sectors sufficient risk management practices have to be put
in place to ensure that the risks undertaken are not disproportionate to the expected
rewards. Moreover, there is a need to ensure that mutual funds in a developing low
immature, market like Pakistan do not indulge in speculative transactions.
As per R. 49(1), a close-end company shall clearly state its investment policy in its
constitutive documents and prospectus. A close-end company may only invest in listed
securities or up to twenty percent (20%) in government securities or investment grade
debt securities.70 A close-end company’s investment in a security shall not exceed 10%
of the paid-up capital of the close-end company or ten percent (10%) of the listed
securities of the listed company, whichever is lower. A close-end company may not
invest more than twenty-five percent (25%) of its net asset value in any one sector.71
The SECP may relax any of these conditions if it deems fit.72
Open-end fund are also required to clearly state their investment policies in their
offering documents.73 Equity open-end funds are required to invest at least fifty percent
(50%) of their assets in listed securities.74 An open-end fund’s investment in any one
security shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the paid-up capital of the fund or ten
percent (10%) of the total securities of the listed company, whichever is lower.75 An
OEF shall not invest more than twenty-five percent (25%) of its net asset value in any
one sector.76
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68 In the U.S., the quarterly and annual shareholder reports contain a mandatory management’s discussion
on the fund's performance (‘MDFP’). The MDFP is the mutual fund's version of the management's
discussion and analysis (‘MD&A’) section of a listed company's shareholder reports. In this section the
management is required to discuss, in plain English, their evaluation of the fund’s performance, reasons
for any successes or failures and common sense analysis of future prospects. See Longstreth  (1998).
69 It has been claimed that the funds industry in China, just like Pakistan, is characterized by the existence
of funds that have very similar investment strategies, which prevents investors from distinguishing between
them [Dong, (2003)].
70 R. 49(2) of the NBFC Rules. In comparison, if a U.S. investment company advertises itself as a ‘diversified’
fund, it must invest seventy-five percent (75%) of its assets in cash or cash items, government securities,
securities of other investment companies, and other securities. However, it may not invest more than five
percent (5%) of the fund's assets or more than ten percent (10%) of the portfolio company’s securities.
See Karmel (2005).
71 R. 49(4) of the NBFC Rules.
72 R. 49(5) of the NBFC Rules.
73 R. 71(1) of the NBFC Rules.
74 R. 71(2) of the NBFC Rules.
75 R. 71(3) of the NBFC Rules.
76 R. 71(4) of the NBFC Rules.The SECP may relax any of these conditions if it deems fit.77 The diversification
requirements for close-end companies seek to ensure that the shares of such companies,
which are only traded in secondary markets, may be clearly valued.78 If close-end
companies were to invest heavily in un-listed securities, their own shares are likely to
be under-priced in the market. In contrast, since open-end funds’ units may be readily
redeemed, such funds may be granted greater latitude to invest in un-listed securities
at their own peril. As regards, the requirements ensuring that all mutual funds invest
in diverse sectors, the SECP has relaxed these diversification requirements if a suitable
case is presented, as for example with the Meezan Islamic Fund.
F. Expense and Fee Structures
Mutual fund fees and expenses may have a direct bearing on the income and profits
that the funds generate and whether investors find them to be valuable intermediaries.
Accordingly, there may be a case for imposing limitations on or standardizing fees and
certain expenses. The application fee for the authorization of a close-end company is
twenty-five thousand Rupees (Rs. 25,000) while that for an open-end fund is Rupees
one million.79 A mutual fund is required to pay an annual fee equal to 0.1% the average
annual net asset value to the SECP.80 An Investment Advisor of a close-end fund or
an Asset Management Company of an open-end fund may be paid an annual remuneration
of an amount not exceeding three percent (3%) of the average annual net asset value
of the fund for the first five years, and two percent (2%) thereafter.81 A close-end fund
is required to distribute to its shareholders at least ninety percent (90%) of any income
it has received.82 An open-end fund must redeem its units within six (6) working days
of the request for redemption.83 The fund may charge such redemption fees as have
been disclosed in the offering documents.
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77 R. 71(5) of the NBFC Rules.
78 Consistent with the enabling model and assumption of efficient markets the Investment Company Act in
the U.S. does not impose such diversification requirements. Investment companies are free to decide upon
their investment strategies so long as shareholders ratify significant changes in that strategy. For a criticism
of such free reign given to mutual funds, see Karmel (2005).
79 R. 41(f) and R. 67(e) of the NBFC Rules, respectively.
80 R. 54e and R. 79 of the NBFC Rules, respectively.
81 R. 53 and R. 66 of the NBFC Rules, respectively. Contrast this bright line rule from the ‘enabling’ standard
in U.S. law. According to 15 U.S.C. sec. 80a-35(b), both the independent directors and the investment
adviser owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders with respect to the fees. In Krinsk v. Fund Asset
Management, Inc. the Appeals Court held that the test for determining if fiduciary duty is satisfied is
‘whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at
arm's length in light of all the surrounding circumstances.’ See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, Inc.
(2nd Cir. 1989), 875 F.2d 404 at 409. Comparing with China, management fees for the first funds (RMB
2 billion) were originally set at 2.5% per but were criticized by investors as being excessive. For the
second group of funds (offered at RMB 3 billion each) the fees were reduced to 1.5% per annum. However,
performance fees were made payable to the fund managers if a funds generated net profits exceeding the
one-year fixed deposit rate by 20% and the growth rate of the fund's net asset value exceeded the average
return on A shares in the stock markets [see Dong (2003)].
82 R. 55 of the NBFC Rules.
83 R. 80(6) of the NBFC Rules.G. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
As Khorana, Servaes and Tufano concluded, a strong regulatory and judicial
framework appears to lead to the development of the mutual fund industry.84 In case
of mismanagement of assets and investments, what recourse do investors have against
a mutual fund? If an investor feels aggrieved by the management of a mutual fund, the
only option or that investor is to complain to the SECP or file a lawsuit. In most cases,
a lawsuit is not a viable option especially if the investment is a small one. Furthermore,
given the weaknesses of the judicial system, especially the likely delay, the investors
are unlikely to sue if they feel aggrieved. Hence, there is less pressure on fund mangers
to perform their fiduciary duties.
In case of a complaint to the SECP, the NBFC rules do not provide for compensation
of the investor, an omission which needs to be addressed. Additionally, it may be
advisable for the rules to incorporate arbitration under the umbrella of the SECP or a
self-regulatory authority. The MUFAP has not been granted self-regulatory status yet.
Perhaps it is time to do that and provide a platform for arbitration, similar to that offered
by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in the U.S.A.85
H. Advertisement
The public in Pakistan is generally unaware of mutual funds and their capacity as
investment vehicles. If mutual funds are to attract individual investors, they need to
actively advertise their services. Here, we also need to ensure that there is no false
advertising and the general public is not misled for that will erode public confidence
in mutual funds and the securities markets in the long run.
The offering documents of close-end funds must meet the requirements of the
Companies Ordinance, 1984, as well as provide certain information set out in the
Schedule-III of the NBFC Rules, 2003.86 The offering documents of open-end funds
must meet the requirements of Schedule-IV of the Rules.87 Advertisements of all mutual
funds must be approved by the SECP in advance.88
I. Preferential Treatment and Tax Incentives
We have advanced the argument that mutual funds play a more vital role in corporate
governance than banks and other financial intermediaries since they attract the general
public to the securities markets and may help improve the public’s perceptions of these
markets. Accordingly, it may further be argued that mutual funds should be favoured
over banks as regards the opportunities to invest in equity securities.
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84 See Khorana et al. (2004).
85 A similar argument for has been made for a self-regulating organization in China. [Dong (2003)].
86 R. 48 of the NBFC Rules.
87 R. 70 of the NBFC Rules.
88 R. 48 and 70 of the NBFC Rules for close-end companies and open-end funds, respectively.Likewise, it may be argued that tax incentives should be structured in such a way that
the general public is encouraged to invest through mutual funds rather than on their
own.
At present, investments through mutual funds are treated at par with direct investments
by individuals, as regards the structuring of tax incentives. Both manners of investment
are exempted from capital gains89 while the withholding taxes on dividend incomes are
set at ten percent (10%) regardless whether the dividends are received directly from a
listed company or passed through to the unit/shareholders by a mutual fund. However,
accounting for the fees and expenses deducted by a fund, an investor stands to gain
more in pure financial terms by investing directly rather than through a fund. Therefore,
it may be argued that dividend income received through mutual funds should be
exempted from withholding tax in order to motivate individuals to invest through
mutual funds.
J. The Role of the Regulator
In The U.S. the S.E.C. acts primarily as a rule making, investigation and enforcement
agency. The S.E.C. is not known to be proactive in enforcement and industry supervision:
its primary role is to ensure that corporate criminals are prosecuted and prospective
wrongdoers thereby deterred. However, the S.E.C. is dealing with an enormous corporate
and securities jurisdiction and can rely on courts, civil suits, state regulators and self-
regulatory organizations to back it up and reduce its workload.
In the absence of such support, and given its comparatively smaller workload, the SECP
should not conduct passive oversight of the market and its participants but arguably
should play a more proactive role in managing the securities industry. The performance
of a proactive and aggressive role in securities regulation would require significant
increase in the capacity of the SECP. Given the resource constraints, it is unlikely that
the SECP will be able to develop the capacity to perform such proactive oversight
across the board in the near future. However, through active oversight of financial
intermediaries, including mutual funds, and by ensuring that such intermediaries’
transactions are above-board, the SECP can indirectly develop a very positive governance
environment. Accordingly, the NBFC Rules, 2003, have significantly expanded the
SECP’s jurisdiction by giving it authority over the non-banking financial sector in
addition to that over the securities markets and listed companies.90 The SECP should
exercise its new regulatory powers with diligence and ensure that the right governance
culture is developed first in the financial intermediaries who may then insist on similar
practices being followed by the listed companies they invest in.
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89 Similarly, in China, there is also no capital gains tax on investment in stocks or stock funds and tax
incentives play a small role in the development of the fund industry. See Dong (2003). In the U.S., it has
been argued that the capital gains tax creates a disincentive for MF. For the effect of capital gains on US
MF investments see Krishna (1996). It is also argued that capital gains tax creates incentive for investors
to invest in funds that don’t trade actively. See Kertz & Simko (2001).
90 The State Bank of Pakistan previously regulated non-banking finance companies.Moeen Cheema and Sikander A. Shah / CMER Working Paper No. 06-47
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6. Conclusions
We have advanced the argument in this paper that the development of an appropriate
corporate governance culture is contingent upon the adoption of a regulatory framework
based upon clear bright line rules tailored to the particular legal and economic environment
prevalent in Pakistan. The regulation of the securities markets should seek to ensure,
as its primary aims, that minority investors are afforded sufficient protection without
unduly and bureaucratically restricting the discretion managements of listed
companiesneed to possess in making business decisions. This difficult balance may
only be achieved if institutional investors generally, and mutual funds particularly, are
encouraged to play a significant role in corporate governance.
A review of the NBFC Rules, 2003, indicates that the new regulatory framework
put in place for mutual funds is based upon the right premises and will facilitate mutual
funds to develop in such a way that they may become significant market participants.
The implementation of the rules and their further development should be considered
in the light of the specific regulatory concerns highlighted in the last part of the paper.
Furthermore, it is imperative that the SECP should recognize the significance of mutual
funds and related NBFCs for corporate governance and the role they can play in
developing the public’s confidence in the securities markets. Therefore, the SECP
should exercise its new jurisdiction in such a manner as to facilitate the growth of
mutual funds while at the same time ensuring that the internal corporate governance
of these funds is flawless. This would require a strong and symbiotic partnership
between the regulator and the regulated.References
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